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INTRODUCTION 
Our police officers are charged with keeping society safe.  This task 
is continuous and comprehensive.  In 2011, almost sixty-three million 
Americans age 16 or older had contact with police.1  Of these individuals, 
nearly twenty-six and a half million were involved in involuntary traffic 
stops.2  Mistakes are bound to happen with this many traffic stops, and of 
course, humans make mistakes, as legions of quotes evidence.3  These 
mistakes range from the minor gaffe, i.e., forgetting car keys, to a major 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011 1 (2013), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4779 (last visited Oct. 15, 
2014). 
 2 Id. at 2. 
 3 See, e.g., Quotes About Mistakes, GOODREADS.COM, http://www.goodreads.
com/quotes/tag/mistakes (last visited Sept. 29, 2014); Mistakes Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, 
www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/mistakes.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2014); 
Quotations about Mistakes, THE QUOTE GARDEN, www.quotegarden.com/mistakes.html 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2014). 
230 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 11:228 
transgression, i.e., accidentally discharging a gun that results in an injury 
or death.4  Perhaps contrary to popular belief, our police officers are no 
different.  This Comment focuses on the mistakes of law police officers 
commit during traffic stops. 
Let us illustrate this point with two hypothetical situations.  In 
scenario one, you are driving on the highway at night.  Flashing lights 
suddenly appear in your rearview mirror.  Not knowing if you are the 
target, you pull over to the side of the road.  The police officer stops, gets 
out of the car, and walks over.  The police officer says you were pulled 
over because one of your taillights was out, a violation of the local traffic 
law.  Both taillights, however, do work.  The officer mistakenly believed 
only one light worked, while both, in fact, function properly.  
Nevertheless, he asks you for your license and registration.  As he waits, 
the police officer smells marijuana, and asks if he can search your vehicle.  
You oblige his request.  The subsequent search reveals a small bag of 
marijuana.  You are arrested and charged with possession and perhaps 
even intent to distribute.5 
In scenario two, you are pulled over in the same manner and for the 
same reason – an allegedly faulty taillight.  This time the taillight does not 
work.  The police officer articulates that driving with only one taillight 
violates the law.  In reality, this is not correct.  It is not illegal to drive with 
a faulty taillight, but the same search takes place and the same marijuana 
is found.  You are arrested and charged with possession and intent to 
distribute. 
Although the two hypotheticals contain several small differences, the 
fundamental difference is the police officer’s mistake in the initial traffic 
stop.  In scenario one, the police officer initiated a traffic stop while 
operating under a mistake of fact – a mistake of a circumstance or detail.6  
In this situation, the mistake of fact was that one taillight was broken, when 
it was not.  These types of mistakes result in consistent outcomes in federal 
and state courts alike.  In scenario two, however, the police officer 
committed a mistake of law – believing specific conduct violates a law 
                                                                                                                                     
 4 See, e.g., Burress Tells Giants He Shot Himself in Leg by Accident, ESPN (Nov. 30, 
2008, 9:18 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3733021; Tina Kelley, Gun 
Owned by Ex-Athlete Killed Driver of Limousine, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 16, 2002), 
http://http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/16/nyregion/gun-owned-by-ex-athlete-killed-
driver-of-limousine.html. 
 5 Forget for a moment that a number of states have legalized marijuana.  For this 
introduction, assume marijuana is still completely illegal everywhere. 
 6 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1092 (9th ed. 2009) (“A mistake about a fact that is 
material to a transaction; any mistake other than a mistake of law.”). 
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when it really does not.7  Mistakes of law, by contrast, result in varying 
outcomes in federal and state courts alike. 
Courts generally give deference to a police officer’s mistake of fact.  
The Supreme Court has articulated that a reasonable mistake of fact does 
not negate probable cause.8  In traffic stops, courts often look at the 
reasonableness of the factual mistake.9  Courts have had little difficulty 
asserting that a mistake of fact, if reasonable, does not constitutionally 
invalidate a traffic stop.10 
Identifying the proper discourse for a mistake of law has not been so 
easy, as mistakes of law for traffic stops have spurred confusion and 
inconsistency among the courts.  The federal courts of appeals in particular 
are in disagreement on the issue.11  The minority view permits admission 
of evidence under an objectively reasonable examination of the 
circumstances, such as whether the actual mistake of law was reasonable.  
The majority view, with which this Comment agrees, holds that a traffic 
stop premised on a mistake of law is an automatic violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, and should therefore result in a categorical exclusion of any 
evidence subsequent to the initial stop.12 
This Comment takes the position that a categorical exclusion is the 
correct response to a police officer’s traffic stop when conducted on a 
mistake of law.  Part II of this Comment provides background on the issue, 
first by reviewing the difference between reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause within the context of a traffic stop.  The section then 
provides a brief overview of the Fourth Amendment, its exclusionary rule, 
and the good faith exception doctrine.  Next, the section offers a thorough 
examination of the split that is currently plaguing circuit courts, reviewing 
the majority view’s categorical exclusion, examining the minority view’s 
                                                                                                                                     
 7 Id. (“A mistake about the legal effect of a known fact or situation.”). 
 8 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) (“It is apparent that in order to satisfy 
the ‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded 
of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made . . . is not that they always 
be correct, but that they always be reasonable.”). 
 9 United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006) (“When an officer 
makes a stop based on a mistake of fact, we ask only whether the mistake was 
reasonable.”). 
 10 United States v. Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] mere mistake 
of fact will not render a stop illegal, if the objective facts known to the officer gave rise to 
a reasonable suspicion . . . .”); see also, United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1006 
(11th Cir. 1992) (“A policeman’s mistaken belief of fact can properly contribute to a 
probable cause determination and can count just as much as a correct belief as long as the 
mistaken belief was reasonable in the light of all the circumstances.”). 
 11 See discussion infra Part II (C). 
 12 See discussion infra Part II (C). 
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objective reasonableness approach, and concluding with a clarifying – 
perhaps middle ground – standard from the Tenth Circuit. 
Part III of this Comment analyzes why the categorical exclusion 
approach is preferable to the minority’s view, and how the latter method 
falls short.  This part then evaluates why the Tenth Circuit’s view also 
fails.  Next, Part III distinguishes the issue of this Comment from other 
mistakes of law, notably those in Devenpeck v. Alford.13  Finally, this 
section argues why the good faith doctrine should not extend to a police 
officer’s mistake of law in traffic stops. 
Part IV anticipates and applies the qualified immunity argument.  
This part articulates the central purpose of qualified immunity, and 
responds to the argument by demonstrating how qualified immunity can 
coexist with the categorical exclusion approach.  Part V provides an 
overview and analysis of Heien v. North Carolina14, a case that explicitly 
raises the issue discussed in this Comment.  Part VI concludes this 
Comment. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Determining Reasonable Suspicion for Traffic Stops 
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court upheld an officer’s “stop-and-
frisk” of two individuals, who were later convicted for carrying concealed 
weapons.15  The Court employed a dual inquiry as to whether the search 
and seizure was reasonable, asking “whether the officer’s action was 
justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”16  The 
Terry Court found the search was constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment because the officer had reasonable suspicion.17 
Articulating the plain definitions of reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause is a daunting task.18  Both concepts are “fluid  . . .  turning 
on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts – not 
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”19  Probable 
cause exists when “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
                                                                                                                                     
 13 543 U.S. 146 (2004). 
 14 134 S. Ct. 1872 (2014) (pending currently before the Court). 
 15 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). 
 16 Id. at 20. 
 17 Id. at 30. 
 18 Ornelas v United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (“Articulating precisely what 
‘reasonable suspicion’ . . . mean[s] is not possible.”). 
 19 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). 
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crime will be found.”20  At its core, reasonable suspicion requires less.21  
Reasonable suspicion requires “a particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting the particular person . . . .”22  This objective basis must contain 
“specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable 
inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person . . . is 
engaged in criminal activity.”23 
Courts generally employ Terry’s lesser standard when examining a 
case dealing with a traffic stop.24  Thus, police officers are afforded broad 
latitude when conducting searches and seizures.  The protection and “flip-
side of [this] leeway,” though, requires objective legal justifications.25 
B.  Evolution of the Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule  
The Fourth Amendment provides persons the right “to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures  . . .  and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or things to be seized.”26  This language has 
afforded citizens an expectation of privacy, whether in the streets or in the 
comforts of home, from unjustified police intrusions.27  Courts have 
                                                                                                                                     
 20 Id.at 238.; Wayne R. LaFave, The ‘Routine Traffic Stop’ From Start to Finish: Too 
Much ‘Routine,’ Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1859-60 (2004) 
(discussing how Whren’s holding is wrong under Terry’s analysis); see infra Part II (C)(1) 
(Some scholars and courts, even courts cited later in this paper, discuss Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) to a large extent.  The discussions and citations to Whren may 
be misplaced.  The central purpose of Whren was the discussion on subjective intent of 
arresting officers, specifically pretext.  However, the Whren court did touch upon traffic 
stops and hint at requiring probable cause – “An automobile stop is  . . .  subject to the 
constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.  As a 
general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have 
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred,” at 810 – which, if anything, 
provides additional support for a categorical exclusion of evidence during an illegitimate 
traffic stop since probable cause is required but not present.). 
 21 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) (“Because of the limited 
nature of the intrusion, stops of this sort may be justified on facts that do not amount to the 
probable cause required for an arrest.”) 
 22 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 
 23 United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 53 F.3d 244, 246 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 24 See LaFave, supra note 20, at 1848 (“Most courts have assumed . . . that traffic stops 
as a class are permissible without probable cause if there exists reasonable suspicion . . . .”); 
see also Daniel N. Haas, Comment, Must Officers Be Perfect?: Mistakes of Law and 
Mistakes of Fact During Traffic Stops, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2013). 
 25 United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing United 
States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 27 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“This inestimable right of personal security 
belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in 
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routinely recognized that this Fourth Amendment protection applies to 
motorists and stops of a vehicle.28 
The Court developed the concept of an exclusionary rule to deter 
police misconduct and further safeguard this expectation of privacy.29  The 
rule renders inadmissible any evidence gained by Fourth Amendment 
violations.  However, this general concept has evolved over time, and has 
its own limits. 
The Supreme Court recognized in 1886, that the Fourth Amendment 
“appl[ies] to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees 
of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”30  The Court 
stated that it is the “invasion of [a man’s] indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty and private property” that constitutes the essence 
of this offense.31  Accordingly, the use of evidence seized in violation of a 
man’s Fourth Amendment right was deemed unconstitutional.32  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court stated “it is the duty of the courts to be 
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen and against any stealthy 
encroachments thereon.”33 
These reasonable expectations of privacy are a cornerstone of 
citizens’ liberties.  However, it was not until 1914, in Weeks v. United 
States,34 that the Supreme Court fashioned a remedy for such egregious 
liberty infringement – the exclusionary rule.35  The Court held in Weeks 
“for the first time [that] in a federal prosecution, the Fourth Amendment 
barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure.”36  
This meant that “conviction by means of unlawful seizures  . . .  should 
                                                                                                                                     
his study to dispose of his secret affairs.”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A] person has a constitutionally protected reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the 
very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”). 
 28 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (“The Fourth Amendment applies 
to . . . brief investigatory stops such as the stop of the vehicle here.”); see also United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 
(1969) (“The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures . . . including seizures that involve 
only a brief detention short of a traditional arrest.”). 
 29 See infra notes 17–38 and accompanying text. 
 30 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 638. 
 33 Id. at 635. 
 34 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 35 Davis v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (citations omitted) (“That 
rule . . . is a ‘prudential’ doctrine, created . . . to ‘compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty.’”). 
 36 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). 
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find no sanction in the judgments of the [federal] courts,”37 and that such 
evidence “shall not be used at all.”38   In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court extended 
the applicability of the exclusionary rule to the states.39  The Mapp Court 
stated that, absent application to states, the Fourth Amendment’s 
assurances would simply “be ‘a form of words,’ valueless and undeserving 
of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties  . . .  as 
not to merit  . . .  high regard as a freedom ‘implicit in ‘the concept of 
ordered liberty.’’”40 
The Court provided the general analytical framework used in 
applying the exclusionary rule in Hudson v. Michigan.41  In Hudson, the 
Court, faced with the issue of a potential violation of the Fourth 
Amendment’s “knock-and-announce rule,” discussed the exclusionary 
rule and the requisite balancing of deterrence and social cost.  The Court 
stated that reasonableness is not part of the inquiry into whether evidence 
is excluded or not.42  The inquiry of exclusion is actually “an issue separate 
from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights  . . .  were 
violated.”43  The exclusionary rule inquiry focuses solely on the balance 
of deterrence benefits against the social costs.44  When the deterrence 
benefits, i.e., curtailing knock-and-announce violations by police, 
outweigh the social costs, i.e., “police officers’ refraining from timely 
entry after knocking and announcing,” the evidence should be excluded.45 
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is “to deter future 
unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth 
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.”46  In United 
States v. Calandra, the Court acknowledged that defendants, in typical 
                                                                                                                                     
 37 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392). 
 38 Id. at 648 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 
(1920)). 
 39 Id. at 643. See generally David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme 
Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2013) (providing an in-depth examination of the exclusionary rule and its 
history). 
 40 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). 
 41 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 42 Id. at 591–92. 
 43 Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 222 (1983)). 
 44 Id. at 594–96. 
 45 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 595–96. 
 46 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) ((“The wrong condemned is 
the unjustified governmental intrusion . . . That wrong, committed in this case, is fully 
accomplished by the original search without probable cause.” (emphasis added)); see also 
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and 
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 
(1983). 
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criminal trials, are “entitled to suppression of, not only the evidence 
obtained through an unlawful search and seizure, but also any derivative 
use of that evidence.”47 
In United States v. Leon, the Court curtailed this broad reading, 
holding the exclusionary rule did not apply when police acted “in 
objectively reasonable reliance” on a subsequently invalidated search 
warrant.48  In doing so the Court created the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule.49  The Court found that where a “police officer’s 
conduct is objectively reasonable, ‘excluding the evidence will not further 
the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way.’”50  Here, the Court 
employed a costs-and-benefits factor test,51 admitting the evidence after 
finding that suppressing the evidence would not “justify the substantial 
costs of exclusion.”52  At least one scholar has summarized Leon as 
precluding exclusion in the face of an officer’s reasonable mistake of 
law.53  The Leon test seemingly weakened the exclusionary rule, 
introducing an ordinary standard that ended the strict liability rule applied 
to the general public: “Ignorance of the law is no excuse.”54 
The Supreme Court limited the exclusionary rule again in United 
States v. Herring, which dealt with a negligent (not reasonable) mistake.55  
The Court held that, despite being a Fourth Amendment violation, an arrest 
based on a mistake in a police database that indicated an active warrant for 
an individual, does not trigger the exclusionary rule.56  Thus, police 
conduct that is “sufficiently deliberate  . . .  and sufficiently culpable” to 
warrant exclusion and deterrence triggers the exclusionary rule, because 
the rule itself “serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 
                                                                                                                                     
 47 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354. 
 48 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). 
 49 Id. at 920–21; see infra text accompanying notes 131–141.  See generally Note, 
Toward A General Good Faith Exception, 127 HARV. L. REV. 773 (2013) (arguing for a 
good faith exception in all reasonable mistakes). 
 50 Leon, 468 U.S. at 919–20 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) 
(White, J., dissenting)). 
 51 Id. at 906–07; see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1987) (“[T]o the 
extent that application of the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental deterrent, 
that possible benefit must be weighed against [its] substantial social costs.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 52 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. 
 53 Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 463, 488–89 (2009). 
 54 Id. 
 55 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 56 Id. at 137–41. 
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conduct.”57  Police mistakes in the case were the “result of [simple] 
negligence  . . .  rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of 
constitutional requirements,” and as such, the “marginal deterrence [did] 
not ‘pay its way.’”58 
In Davis v. United States, the Court was again faced with the question 
of whether or not to apply the exclusionary rule.59  The Court found that 
the police officers lacked culpability approaching the levels as outlined in 
Herring: “The officers who conducted the search did not violate Davis’ 
Fourth Amendment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross 
negligence.”60  The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule would only 
deter “conscientious police work,” something that would contradict its 
holding in Herring, and the Court was not ready to make the exclusionary 
rule “become a strict-liability regime.”61 
To be sure, the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy, not 
an express constitutional requirement.62  The rule advances limitations on 
the admissibility of evidence when the benefits of deterring the actions 
invoking a Fourth Amendment violation outweigh the substantial social 
costs of withholding the evidence.  An unreasonable search or seizure, or 
other Fourth Amendment violation may trigger the exclusionary rule, but 
if evidence is the result of reasonable procedures, processes, or mistakes, 
the evidence is once again admissible. 
C.  Federal Circuit Split on Police Officer’s Mistake of Law During a 
Traffic Stop 
The federal circuits, as well as state courts,63 are split on the result of 
a police officer’s mistake of law during a traffic stop.  This section 
                                                                                                                                     
 57 Id. at 145; see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (holding police negligence 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment or trigger the exclusionary rule). 
 58 Herring, 555 U.S. at 147–48 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08, n. 6). 
 59 Davis v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) (discussing whether police can 
conduct searches while reasonably relying on binding judicial precedent). 
 60 Id. at 2428. 
 61 Id. at 2429. 
     62 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("In sum, the rule is a 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party 
aggrieved."). 
 63 Compare People v. Reyes, 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2011) 
(holding “a pure mistake of law like that the officer apparently made here cannot provide 
objectively reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop”); Langello v. State, 970 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding the officer’s lacked probable cause on mistaken belief that 
law was violated by equipment); People v. Cole, 874 N.E.2d 81 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); State 
v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 654 (Iowa 2010) (finding that the record could not “provide 
the necessary probable cause to justify the traffic stop at issue in this case[,]” and declining 
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examines the notable cases from the circuits that have weighed in on this 
issue.  First, this section describes the cases demonstrating the majority’s 
approach of categorical exclusion.  Then, the section discusses the cases 
exemplifying the minority view of objective reasonableness.  Finally, this 
section discusses United States v. Nicholson, a case that aligns with the 
majority view that mistakes of law are objectively unreasonable, but also 
employs an objective analysis to account for an officer’s subjective 
misunderstanding of the law.64 
1. Categorical Exclusion 
The majority of federal circuit courts that have weighed in – the Fifth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh – have explicitly held a police officer’s 
mistake of law for a traffic stop is an automatic violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, rendering inadmissible any evidence resulting from that 
stop.65 
In United States v. Miller, the Fifth Circuit held that because the 
defendant was not in violation of Texas law, there was no probable cause 
for the stop and therefore anything seized was inadmissible in court.66  The 
officer had stopped the defendant for having the left turn signal on for the 
period of time in which the vehicle proceeded through an intersection, but 
did not turn or change lanes to the left.67  The officer pulled defendant over 
and issued him a warning citation for improper use of a left turn signal.  
The officer then told the defendant he was looking for illegal contraband, 
and asked for consent to search his motor home.  The defendant 
consented.68  The police found approximately eighty kilograms of 
marijuana.69  Defendant was arrested and indicted for possession with 
intent to distribute marijuana.70  The defendant filed a motion to suppress 
                                                                                                                                     
to choose an actual side, but went away from the Eighth Circuit’s decision – an objectively 
reasonable approach.); State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818 (Minn. 2004); with Moore v. 
State, 986 So.2d 928 (Miss. 2008); State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012); City of 
Wilmington v. Conner, 761 N.E.2d 663 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); State v. Wright, 791 N.W.2d 
791 (S.D. 2010). 
 64 United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 65 See United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 
(11th. Cir. 2003); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 
96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006) (identifying the circuit split on mistakes of law, seemingly taking 
the majority view). 
 66 Miller, 146 F.3d at 276. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
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the marijuana, on the grounds that it was obtained as the result of an 
unconstitutional stop.  The defendant argued there is no violation under 
Texas law for flashing a turn signal without turning or changing lanes.  As 
such, there was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop him.71  
The district court denied the motion.72 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no objective basis for 
probable cause to justify the stop of the defendant, because having a turn 
signal on does not violate Texas law.73  The court found that the plain 
reading of the statute does not support the interpretation advanced by the 
prosecution.74  In reaching its holding the court acknowledged Whren’s 
rule, which affords “officers broad leeway to conduct searches and 
seizures,” but that “the legal justification must [still] be objectively 
grounded.”75  The court stated that, “no objective basis for probable cause” 
existed here, because the defendant’s actions did not violate Texas law.76 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s rationale in United 
States v. Lopez-Soto.77  The Ninth Circuit held that the officer’s actions 
were wrong because he incorrectly believed that driving with a broken 
taillight violated the law.  Thus, the officer had no objective basis to justify 
a stop under the Fourth Amendment.78  The Eleventh Circuit weighed in 
on the issue in United States v. Chanthasouxat,79 articulating the issue as 
“whether a mistake of law, no matter how reasonable or understandable, 
can provide the objectively reasonable suspicion (under Terry) or probable 
cause (under Whren).”80  The court reasoned that a mistake of law could 
not provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify a traffic 
stop.”81 
In United States v. McDonald, the Seventh Circuit similarly held that 
“an officer cannot have a reasonable belief that a violation of the law 
occurred when the acts to which an officer points as supporting probable 
                                                                                                                                     
 71 Id. at 277. 
 72 Miller, 146 F.3d at 276. 
 73 Id. at 279. 
 74 Id. at 278–79. 
 75 Id. at 279 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 812–14 (1996)). 
 76 Id.; see also United States v. Raney, 633 F.3d 385, 393 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Because 
the government did not establish that [defendant] committed a traffic violation . . . we find 
that as a matter of law there was no objective basis justifying the traffic stop.”); United 
States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding unconstitutional a 
trooper’s actions of pulling defendant over for wrongfully thinking a violation occurred). 
 77 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that Baja California requires that 
registration stickers be on the upper right hand corner of the windshield). 
 78 Id. at 1106. 
 79 342 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th. Cir. 2003). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
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cause are not prohibited by law.”82  Simply, “subjective belief that a law 
has been broken, when no violation actually occurred, is not objectively 
reasonable.”83 
2. Objective Reasonableness 
The minority approach, championed by the Eighth Circuit, is an 
objective reasonableness test, which takes a totality-of-the-circumstances 
view of the police officer’s mistake during a traffic stop.84  The Eighth 
Circuit is joined by a dissent in United States v. Nicholson,85 which makes 
a compelling argument for the objective reasonableness approach. 
In United States v. Sanders,86 the Eighth Circuit held that, regardless 
of a violation of the local law, an officer is “justified in making the stop if 
he ‘objectively ha[d] a reasonable basis for believing that the driver has 
breached a traffic law.’”87  The court reaffirmed this view in United States 
v. Smart, stating that a distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of 
law is irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment’s inquiry.88  In Smart, the Eighth 
Circuit focused on the sole issue of “whether [the officer] had an 
objectively reasonable basis for stopping [defendant’s] vehicle.”89  The 
court reasoned that an officer, “whose observations lead him or her 
reasonably to suspect that a particular person has been or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity,” possesses the power to stop and 
investigate.90  Applying this principle to the facts in Smart, the officer 
possessed an objectively reasonable basis to stop the vehicle “if he 
reasonably suspected that Smart was operating a vehicle that did not 
comply with Iowa traffic laws.”91  The court ruled the stop was 
constitutional because “[t]he possibility that there was no violation, and 
the subsequent determination that there was not, does not mean that the 
initial suspicion was unreasonable.  That would be so even if we assume 
that the stop was premised on a mistake of law.”92 
                                                                                                                                     
 82 United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 960–61 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 83 Id. at 962. 
 84 See infra Part II(C)(2). 
 85 721 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 86 196 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 87 Id. at 913. 
 88 Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Smart, 393 F.3d at 770; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); 
Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Smart, 393 F.3d at 771 (emphasis added). 
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Following Sanders and Smart, the Eighth Circuit again held that a 
mistake of law would not invalidate a traffic stop if the mistake was 
objectively reasonable.93  In United States v. Martin, the court articulated 
the issue as whether an objectively reasonable police officer could have 
formed a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was committing a 
violation.94  The court noted “[a]ny mistake of law that results in a search 
or seizure . . . must be objectively reasonable to avoid running afoul of the 
fourth amendment.”95  In Martin, the stop was reasonable because “the 
level of clarity [fell] short of that required to declare [the officer’s] belief 
and actions objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.”96  This 
holding was consistent with the recognized principles that “a 
misunderstanding of traffic laws, if reasonable, need not invalidate a stop 
made on that basis.”97 
The Eighth Circuit clarified the objective standard from Martin in a 
later case, United States v. Washington.98  The court noted that the officer 
in Martin faced “counterintuitive and confusing” motor statutes.99  In 
Washington, however, the statute “clearly [did] not prohibit the conduct,” 
which formed the basis of the conviction.100  The court softened this 
holding, reasoning that Washington was “an unusual case” because the 
government conceded no other applicable statute or proffered any other 
evidence – police or training manuals, legislative history, etc. – that could 
“create some objectively reasonable basis for the traffic stop.”101 
3. Expanding Upon the Objective Reasonableness Approach 
Although the Tenth Circuit initially adopted a categorical exclusion 
rule, consistent with the majority view and its circuit precedent,102 it added 
                                                                                                                                     
 93 United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 94 Id. at 1001 (citing Smart, 393 F.3d at 770 (“[T]he validity of the stop depends on 
whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in the circumstances, and in 
mistake cases the question is simply whether the mistake, whether of law or fact, was an 
objectively reasonable one.”)). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 1002. 
 97 Id.; see also United States v. Geelan, 509 F.2d 737, 744 n. 9 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding 
that an Iowa officer’s traffic stop for a failure to display two license plates, although the 
state required only one plate, was constitutional because it was “irrelevant” because the 
officer “did not know Indiana required only one plate.”). 
 98 455 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 99 Id. at 827. (quoting Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001.). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 827–28. 
 102 See United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[F]ailure to 
understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is not objectively 
reasonable.”); United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1144–45 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding 
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an important modification in United States v. Nicholson.103  In Nicholson, 
the officer pulled Nicholson over after concluding that the defendant made 
an illegal turn in violation of Roswell ordinance 12-6-5.1.104  The turn, 
however, was not illegal.105  When he approached the car, the officer 
smelled marijuana and asked Nicholson to step out of the car.106  The 
officer then identified glass pipes and a police scanner in Nicholson’s 
vehicle107 though Nicholson declined to consent to a search when asked.  
The car was subsequently towed and subjected to a search warrant, which 
yielded contraband.108  The lower court determined the stop was legal 
because the ordinance prohibited the left turn that Nicholson made, and 
eventually Nicholson agreed to a conditional plea agreement, but reserved 
right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress.109 
The Tenth Circuit analyzed its previous precedent, and aligned with 
the majority’s categorical exclusion approach, “excus[ing] reasonable 
mistakes of fact, but not ‘reasonable’ mistakes of law.”110  The Tenth 
Circuit further held that traffic stops are upheld “as long as the law 
enforcement officer cites particularized facts that show he could have had 
a reasonable suspicion that any law was being violated.”111  Noting that 
“mistakes of law made by an officer are objectively unreasonable,”112 the 
court, however, retained “an objective, totality of the circumstances 
analysis,” in some situations, for an officer’s actions that are “taken . . . on 
a subjective misunderstanding of the law . . . .”113  The court reasoned that 
an objectively reasonable test, instead of an automatic violation, would not 
have been “too restrictive” in this situation.114  In this capacity, officers 
“can argue they had reasonable suspicion to stop a defendant based on 
any . . . law[]—even if the officer was mistaken about the specific 
law . . . the defendant was violating.  A single mistake by a law 
enforcement officer will not necessarily invalidate the stop and any 
                                                                                                                                     
the officer’s belief that the use of fog lamps violated the law when it did not could not 
provide an objectively justifiable basis for the stop). 
 103 United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 104 Id. at 1237. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Nicholson, 721 F.3d at 1237. 
 109 Id. at 1238. 
 110 Id. at 1242. 
 111 Id. at 1245. 
 112 Id. at 1241–42. 
 113 Nicholson, 721 F.3d at 1242. 
 114 Id. 
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resulting search.”115  The Tenth Circuit, thus, elevated its analysis, 
dictating a different level of legal analysis: 
Against what interpretation of the law should we assess the facts 
when deciding whether there was a reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause to make a traffic stop? Like most of our sister 
circuits, we judge the facts against the correct interpretation of the 
law, as opposed to any other interpretation, even if arguably a 
reasonable one.116 
With this question, the court hoped that borderline cases would 
become clearer, particularly when a local ordinance conflicted with a state 
law.117 
The dissent in Nicholson, however, argued for an objectively 
reasonable test.118  It argued the Framers intended a totality of the 
circumstances analysis, since they forbade “all ‘unreasonable searches and 
seizures.’”119  They posited that by asking what is reasonable, “the whole 
picture” should be examined.120  The officer’s actions should be weighed 
with “commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with the factual 
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”121  The dissent did note that many 
mistakes of law, especially ones dealing with plain and unambiguous laws, 
should result in unreasonable searches and seizures and therefore be 
unconstitutional.122  Ultimately, the dissent asks whether it is reasonable 
to hold that “every mistake of law” violate the fourth amendment.123 
III. ANALYSIS 
This Comment argues for the categorical exclusion of evidence that 
results from a police officer’s mistake of law traffic stop.  This Comment 
further argues that any police officer’s mistake of law as a basis to a traffic 
stop, regardless of reasonableness, is an automatic violation of the Fourth 
                                                                                                                                     
 115 Nicholson, 721 F.3d at 1243. 
 116 Id. at 1244. 
 117 Id. at 1244–45. (In a situation when a local ordinance conflicted with state law, the 
court stated “an officer would more likely be reasonably justified in relying on the local 
ordinance based on the reliance principles set forth in the Supreme Court’s cases analyzing 
mistakes regarding the constitutionality of the law.”). 
 118 Id. at 1246 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 119 Id. at 1248. 
 120 Nicholson, 721 F.3d at 1249 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)). 
 121 Id. (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996)). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 1254. 
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Amendment.  This Part examines the failure of the middle ground 
advocated for in Nicholson.  Finally, this Part discusses the arguments for 
a categorical exclusion and analyzes why the position should withstand 
scrutiny.    
A.  Why the Categorical Exclusion is Preferred124 
1. Rule of Law – Knowing the Law, Inherently and through 
Training (“Ignorance is no excuse”) 
Police officers should know the law.  If this expectation exists for 
ordinary citizens, police officers should be held to the same standard.  The 
objective reasonable approach minimizes an officer’s need to know the 
very laws they are charged with enforcing.  The categorical exclusion, 
however, necessitates as much.  If officers know that the fruits of any 
searches and seizures based on illegitimate stops are subjected to a 
categorical exclusion, then officers are incentivized to know the law. 
In 1885, the Michigan Supreme Court stated as much, positing that 
“[a]n officer of justice is bound to know what the law is, and if the facts 
on which he proceeds, if true, would not justify action under the law, he is 
a wrong-doer.”125  Subsequently, the Supreme Court has similarly 
recognized that the traditional maxim of “ignorance of the law or a mistake 
of law is no defense,” continues to be “deeply rooted in the American legal 
system.”126  United States v. Chanthasoux recognized this well-known 
mantra, further noting that a “fundamental unfairness” persists when 
citizens are barred from using the ignorance-defense but police officers – 
                                                                                                                                     
 124 Contra Daniel N. Haas, Comment, Must Officers Be Perfect?: Mistakes of Law and 
Mistakes of Fact During Traffic Stops, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1035 (2013); John B. Lyman, 
Comment, Goldilocks and the Fourth Amendment: Why the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina Missed an Opportunity to Get Officer Mistakes of Law “Just Right” in State v. 
Heien, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1012 (2014); Brittanee Friedman, Case Comment, Constitutional 
Law-Evidence Seized Based on Reasonable Police Mistake of Law Held Admissible in 
North Carolina Court-State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012), 47 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 
249 (2014).  See generally Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69 
(2011). 
 125 Malcomson v. Scott, 23 N.W. 166, 168 (Mich. 1885). 
 126 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, (1991); cf. Bryan v. United States, 524 
U.S. 184, 196 (1998) (“[T]he traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse.”); 
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 n. 3 (1994); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 
601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (“If the ancient maxim that 
‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ has any residual validity, it indicates that the ordinary 
intent requirement . . . of the criminal law does not require knowledge that an act is illegal, 
wrong, or blameworthy.”). 
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those “‘entrusted to enforce’ the law” – are afforded the leniency to make 
mistakes and not understand or know their own laws.127 
These contrasting levels of expectancy are hypocritical because 
police officer’s mistake of law is the failure to recognize, understand, or 
know the laws of their very own jurisdictions.  This failure is contrary to 
the foundations of law and society.128  Thomas Jefferson aptly recognized 
this disturbing consequence when he noted, “ignorance of the law is no 
excuse in any country. If it were, the laws would lose their effect, because 
it can always be pretended.”129  If courts uphold convictions and evidence 
premised on mistakes of law, then police officers are enabling governing 
laws to be “pretended.”130 
Although the Supreme Court, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, has 
held police officers cannot and should not be expected to know every 
“complex penalty scheme[],” police officers should know the law they are 
tasked with enforcing.131 The Court refers to factual complexities of a 
situation or offense, not whether the law was violated.132  Such facts 
include whether this is the suspect’s first offense or repeat; whether the 
weight of the bag of drug is above or below a fine-only line; or what is the 
severity of the future charge by the district attorney.133  But these factual 
questions refer to a situation’s complexities and details, not to the basic 
question of whether or not the law was violated.  In addition, Atwater, 
which afforded officers leniency for their lack of knowledge of lawful 
                                                                                                                                     
 127 United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th. Cir. 2003). 
 128 Accord ALBERT J. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 175 (Yale Univ. Press, 
5th ed. 1975) (“The legal exercise of police authority reinforces the right of police to use 
it, while its illegal exercise undermines the broader acceptance of the authority as 
legitimate.”); see, e.g., Logan, supra note 124 at 93 (“Branding lawless seizures as 
constitutionally reasonable, and as a consequence allowing incident searches and other 
intrusions, can only lessen confidence in the perceived fairness and legitimacy of police, 
already strained by reports of police fabrications and racial bias.”). 
 129 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Andre Limozin (Dec. 22, 1787), in 12 PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 451 (Boyd ed. 1955). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 348 (2001) (“It is not merely that we 
cannot expect every police officer to know the details of frequently complex penalty 
schemes . . . .”). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 348–49 (“[B]ut that penalties for ostensibly identical conduct can vary on 
account of facts difficult (if not impossible) to know at the scene of an arrest. Is this the 
first offense or is the suspect a repeat offender? Is the weight of the marijuana a gram above 
or a gram below the fine-only line? Where conduct could implicate more than one criminal 
prohibition, which one will the district attorney ultimately decide to charge? And so on.” 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
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schemes, has been attacked as “collaps[ing] under its own weight.”134  
Thus, the expectation to know whether a violation of law occurred persists. 
2. An Officer Cannot Have Reasonable Suspicion without an 
Actual Violation of Law 
A basic requirement for a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion.135  
Reasonable suspicion is justified if circumstances show “that criminal 
activity may be afoot.”136  The key here is that criminal activity, or the 
immediate potential for criminal activity, must be present.137  It follows 
that, without an objective basis of criminal activity, a legitimate stop is 
impossible because a violation of law must occur.138  If no violation 
occurs, then no criminal activity has taken place.  The suspicion, then, is 
baseless. 
But the minority’s objective reasonableness approach reasons 
otherwise.  By using totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion 
can be found even though a violation never took place, or so reasons the 
minority of circuits.  This approach is inappropriate.  Allowing police 
officers to conduct investigatory traffic stops when no violation has 
actually taken place would allow free rein of the very “standardless and 
unconstrained discretion . . . [and] evil the Court” has insisted needs to “be 
circumscribed . . . .”139  The lack of a violation of law, or even “at least 
[an] articulable and reasonable suspicion” of breaking the law, is 
“unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”140 
The mistake of law must be objectively grounded and viewed.  If 
done properly, the sole issue should be whether the law was or was not 
violated.  In these situations, the law was not violated.  The minority 
approach, however, contends that although a law has not actually been 
broken, a police officer’s mistake should be forgiven.  This approach fails 
                                                                                                                                     
 134 Logan, supra note 124, at 84 (“The volume-and-complexity argument, however, 
collapses under its own weight. . . . Such a view, even if not rejected on democratic-
governance concerns alone, would appear especially unjustified given unprecedented 
improvements in the educational backgrounds of police and ready access to substantive 
law, including via dashboard computers.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 135 See, supra notes 15–25 and accompanying text. 
 136 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 137 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 
 138 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (“Where there is not probable cause 
to believe that a driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and 
equipment regulations . . . we cannot conceive of any legitimate basis upon which a 
patrolman could decide that stopping a particular driver for a spot check would be more 
productive than stopping any other driver.”). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 663. 
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because allowing the traffic stop and subsequent search completely 
ignores the falsified premise of the stop.  False grounds cannot reasonably 
legitimize a traffic stop. 
3. Judicial Consistency 
Cases about Fourth Amendment violations should be analogously 
analyzed and yield consistent verdicts from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction.  A 
categorical exclusion would ensure consistent results.  There would be no 
surprises or questionable verdicts.  A categorical exclusion advances 
consistent Fourth Amendment analysis, fulfilling the very consistency that 
the Court has alluded to in the past.141 
An objectively reasonable approach appends the element of 
subjectivity into the analysis.  One court may view the entire record 
differently than another court, one judge may give more deference to the 
facts than another, or one police department may have different training 
manuals than another.  This deference and inconsistency is problematic,142 
whereas a complete categorical exclusion avoids inconsistency – a 
standard completely accepted by some courts.  An officer’s mistake of law 
is black and white, cut and dry; either the mistake did or did not happen; 
either a law was or was not violated.  Accepting a categorical exclusion 
approach simply asks the question of whether a violation actually occurred 
to warrant the traffic stop.  If the basis was due to an officer’s mistake of 
law, the answer will always be no.  A categorical exclusion minimizes the 
potential for varying results. 
B. Why Nicholson’s Approach Cannot Work 
Flexibility with legal standards, remedies, and tests can be 
beneficial.143  However, the flexibility alluded to in Nicholson – allowing 
                                                                                                                                     
 141 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (“A policy of sweeping deference 
would permit, ‘[i]n the absence of any significant difference in the facts,’ ‘the Fourth 
Amendment’s incidence [to] tur[n] on whether different trial judges draw general 
conclusions that the facts are sufficient or insufficient to constitute probable 
cause.’ . . . Such varied results would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of 
law. This, if a matter-of-course, would be unacceptable.”) (quoting Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 171 (1949))); see also Brief for the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Heien v. North Carolina, (No. 
13-604), 2013 WL 6795047 (U.S.), at *8. 
 142 Id.; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (Because police 
officer training materials and manuals and practices can “vary from place to place and from 
time to time . . . [w]e cannot accept that the search and seizure protections of the Fourth 
Amendment are so variable.”) (citations omitted)). 
 143 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009) (“[F]lexibility properly reflects 
our respect for the lower federal courts that bear the brunt of adjudicating these cases.”). 
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a stop on a mistake of law if any basis for stop was legally justified – 
should not be employed.144  The Nicholson court aligned with the majority 
of federal circuits’ categorical exclusion view,145 while holding that in 
certain instances it would adopt an objectively reasonable approach.146  
The court did state that these situations would occur only when an “officer 
cites particularized facts that show he could have had a reasonable 
suspicion that any law was being violated.”147  This language, however, is 
problematic, as exemplified in the hypothetical below. 
An officer pulls Jack over on two grounds, one illegal infraction – 
Jack passed another car while in the right lane – and one which happens 
to be completely legal – driving with one broken taillight.  If the officer 
only says Jack was pulled over because of the broken taillight – which 
happens to be legal – under Nicholson, the stop would still be 
constitutional, even though a justifiable reason was never stated.  
Nicholson’s own precedent, however, contradicts this finding.  In Tibbetts, 
for example, the Tenth Circuit held that “when police completely ignore 
the purported reason justifying the initial traffic stop, a court may consider 
that failure when evaluating the objective reasonableness of the stop under 
the Fourth Amendment.”148 
The reasoning in Tibbetts alludes to the fundamental problem with 
the Nicholson approach.  A police officer’s ability to make a stop on 
completely lawful action, ignoring possible subsequent unlawful conduct, 
is invalid against even the Fourth Amendment’s most liberal readings.  
The stop’s basis would fail to rise to the proper levels for probable cause, 
or even reasonable suspicion.   A traffic stop premised on a mistake of law 
can never meet adequate probable cause because the very basis of the stop 
is completely lawful, and unreasonable. 
                                                                                                                                     
But cf. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 51 (2008) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Flexibility is a hallmark of equity jurisdiction.”). 
 144 United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2013). But see Atwater v. City 
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 325 (2001) (citations omitted) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 
817) (“[A]lthough the Fourth Amendment generally requires a balancing of individual and 
governmental interests, where “an arrest is based on probable cause then ‘with rare 
exceptions . . . the result of that balancing is not in doubt.’”). 
 145 Id.; see also supra Part III(A). 
 146 Nicholson, 721 F.3d at 1245. 
 147 Id. 
 148 United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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C. Distinguishing the Mistake of Law in this Comment from Devenpeck 
v. Alford 
In 2004, the Supreme Court held in Devenpeck v. Alford149 that an 
arrest is constitutional when there is probable cause to believe that the 
arrestee has committed an offense.  This holding may seem, at first glance, 
problematic for this Comment.  However, the holding in Devenpeck is 
readily distinguished from the issue of this Comment. 
1. Facts and Procedural History of Devenpeck 
In Devenpeck, the defendant was pulled over for impersonating a 
police officer.150  The officer who initiated the stop observed that the 
defendant had stopped to help stranded motorists with a flat tire, while 
using “wig-wag” flashing lights.151  The officer eventually stopped the 
defendant and observed that he was listening to a police scanner and a 
radio, had handcuffs, and “seemed untruthful and evasive.”152  Another 
officer arrived on the scene a short time after the stop.153  He observed a 
tape record with the play and record buttons pressed down on the 
defendant’s passenger’s seat.154  After escorting the defendant out of the 
car, he played the recorded tape, which had recorded the officers.155  The 
defendant was arrested for violating the State Privacy Act, and at booking, 
was subsequently issued a ticket for flashing lights.156  The trial court 
dismissed both charges.157 
The defendant sued the police officers in federal court for an arrest 
without probable cause.158  A divided Ninth Circuit panel held that the 
arrest was unwarranted since, at the time of the arrest, the officers cited 
only to the State Privacy Act and not the flashing lights violation.159  The 
Ninth Circuit, finding that taping the officers did not violate the Privacy 
Act, held that the offenses of impersonating an officer and obstructing an 
                                                                                                                                     
 149 Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004). 
 150 Id. at 148–49. 
 151 Id. at 148. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 149. 
 154 Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 149. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 150. 
 157 Id. at 151. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152. 
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officer “were not ‘closely related’ to the offense invoked” at the time of 
arrest.160  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.161 
2. The Court’s Analysis 
The Court held that a rule requiring an offense establishing probable 
cause and an offense identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest 
need not be “closely related.”162  Holding otherwise would be inconsistent 
with Whren v. United States, since subjective intent of an arresting officer 
is irrelevant during an arrest.163  Adhering to the “closely related” rule 
would render any arrest constitutional under a set of known facts to “vary 
from place to place and from time to time.”164  The Court exemplified the 
potential problems with the “closely related” rule.  A veteran officer with 
vast experience would make a valid arrest by articulating all of the reasons 
for the arrest, while a rookie officer, under the same facts, would more 
than likely fail to enumerate the offenses.165 
3. Devenpeck’s Analysis and Holding Distinguished 
Devenpeck does not bear on the issue raised by this Comment.  
Although Devenpeck deals with a potential violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the focus of this Comment are stops that do not gave rise to 
any probable cause or even reasonable suspicion under any known set of 
facts.  Situations in which a police officer initiates a traffic stop on a 
misunderstanding of the law, which the officer is supposed to uphold, and 
then, after the stop, finds evidence of illegal actions.  In Devenpeck, the 
officer’s mistake was not articulating all of the bases of their stop, one of 
which was legitimate.  However, this comment is solely concerned with 
instances when there is no legal basis for a stop on the basis of facts known 
to the officers at the time. 
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D. Why the Good Faith Doctrine Should Not Extend to a Police Officer’s 
Mistake of Law 
Announced in United States v. Leon, the good faith doctrine was 
originally intended as a modification to the exclusionary rule.166  It sought 
to utilize “evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance” on 
a judicially-issued search warrant that is later “found to be unsupported by 
probable cause.”167  Yet, the good faith exception evolved into something 
broader when it incorporated a balancing test that analyzed “the perceived 
deterrent effect against the harm to society when relevant information is 
excluded . . . ”168  The result of this balancing test analysis sends the wrong 
message to the community, a message that constitutional rights, 
specifically the Fourth Amendment, can be “limited by the knowledge of 
the police officer.”169   Thus, the extension of the good faith doctrine for a 
police officer’s mistake of law should end. 
The doctrine should not extend to police officers based on the 
reasonableness of their conduct:  
[S]imple ‘good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not 
enough.’ . . .  If subjective good faith alone were the test, the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the 
people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects,’ only [at] the discretion of the police.’170   
Echoing these words, courts have been properly reluctant to extend 
the good faith doctrine to police officer mistakes of law.171  The Fifth 
Circuit held that the good faith exception should not cover an officer’s 
subjective belief when a mistake of law occurs.172 
Even the Eighth Circuit, which administers the objective reasonable 
test for police officers’ mistakes of law, posits that “subjective good faith 
is not sufficient to justify the stop, for officers have an obligation to 
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252 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 11:228 
understand the laws that they are entrusted with enforcing, at least to a 
level that is objectively reasonable.173  The Ninth Circuit further expanded 
these circuits’ rejection of subjective good faith to objective good faith: 
[T]here is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for police 
who do not act in accordance with governing law.  To create an exception 
here would defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule, for it would 
remove the incentive for police to make certain that they properly 
understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.174 
Ending both the subjective and objective good faith exception to a 
police officer’s mistake may even have desirable consequences.  Instead 
of “‘generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice,’ as its 
critics often contend,”175 applying the exclusionary rule could “have the 
positive effect of reinforcing faith in government law-abidingness, a key 
aspect . . . called ‘public-regarding justice’ and ‘fairness.’”176  The rule 
further encourages the citizen-friendly mantra that if you abide by the law, 
barring any reasonable suspicion or probable cause, you will be left 
alone.177 
Confidence in our legal system is key, and the use of the Leon good 
faith doctrine shatters this confidence.  The doctrine strips this confidence 
and fosters resentment and fragility, while failing to properly encourage 
our police officers to know and understand the laws they are charged with 
enforcing.  If courts consistently uphold incriminating evidence, or any 
evidence unlawfully seized on the grounds of a police officer’s mistake of 
law, officers could conceal any potentially wrong detentions and stops.  
Ending the good faith exception’s application in such situations would 
provide citizens protection from an officer’s potential abuses of power. 
IV. RESPONSE TO A COUNTERARGUMENT AGAINST QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY 
Embracing this categorical exclusion approach may spur the 
question: If an officer’s mistake of law in a traffic stop is always 
unreasonable, resulting in the exclusion of any evidence, should officers 
enjoy the protections of qualified immunity in any subsequent civil suit?  
The answer is yes.  Although this answer may seem counterintuitive 
because officers’ stops premised on a mistake of law are always 
                                                                                                                                     
 173 United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 174 Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1106 (citation omitted). 
 175 Logan, supra note 123, at 93–94 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 
(1976)). 
 176 Id. at 94 (citations omitted) (quoting Tracey L. Meares, The Progressive Past, in 
THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, 209, 216 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009)). 
 177 Although this paragraph’s arguments may be equally applicable to mistake of fact, 
this article focuses on good faith for mistakes of law. 
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objectively unreasonable, qualified immunity protection counterbalances 
the automatic exclusion of evidence by ensuring that police are not 
deterred from using their best judgment due to the fear of potentially 
crippling personal liability.  While a citizen should not be deprived of his 
or her liberty by a police mistake of law, citizens also need the protection 
afforded by officers not practicing “defensive policing.” 
After establishing that any officer’s mistake of law is an automatic 
violation of the Fourth Amendment and resultant categorical exclusion of 
evidence, unlawfully detained individuals may well seek damages.  These 
individuals can bring civil actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which affords 
wronged individuals an opportunity for justice in the form of monetary 
damages, among other remedies.178  The Supreme Court expanded the 
scope of § 1983 to include unsanctioned acts by government officials, 
including police officers.179  However, the Court has recognized that not 
every violation of the constitution is actionable in damages.180 
In Pierson v. Ray, the Court afforded police officers with qualified 
immunity protections for an unconstitutional arrest.181  The Court extended 
to officers a “defense of good faith and probable cause,” under § 1983 
actions.182  The doctrine, which provides protection for “mere mistakes in 
judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law,”183 creates a 
balance between “two important interests—the need to hold public 
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need 
to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they 
perform their duties reasonably.”184  Some lower courts have isolated 
exceptions to the immunity, including those “who otherwise act without 
objectively reasonable grounds to believe that probable cause 
exists . . . .”185 
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In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court held that officers were afforded 
qualified immunity because the “clearly established law” failed to show a 
Fourth Amendment violation.186  But the law is not always clearly 
established, nor is an officer’s conduct clearly within the confines of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Thus, officers are also granted qualified immunity 
“when an officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with 
the law.”187  The question turns “on the objective legal reasonableness of 
the action,” when actually performed.188 
Based on these principles, the easy answer may be that a police 
officer’s mistake of law should not invoke qualified immunity protections.  
Arguably qualified immunity, based on objective reasonableness, cannot 
exist when a mistake of law is always objectively unreasonable.  However, 
the purposes of the two inquiries are different.  Personal liability for what 
can be described as a reasonable, but mistaken view of the law would lead 
police to enforce only the clearest violations in the most obvious factual 
situations.  The result would be an inevitable increase in crime. 
At the same time, police officers must be accountable when 
committing a stop on the illegitimate grounds of a legal violation.189  In 
fact, police officers’ actions are accountable on these grounds.  The 
categorical exclusion approach provides the counterweight to qualified 
immunity for officers by excluding all of the evidence.  Thus, the incentive 
for police officers to act with proper conduct and the balance between 
public safety and protection of individual rights are preserved. 
V. A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY IS PRESENTLY BEFORE THE COURT 
The Supreme Court is presented with an opportunity to resolve this 
divide among the federal circuits.  On April 21, 2014, the Court granted 
certiorari for Heien v. North Carolina190, and then heard oral arguments 
on October 6, 2014.191  The question presently before the Court is simple: 
“Whether a police officer’s mistake of law can provide the individualized 
suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop.”192  
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2014] Some Mistakes are Greater than Others 255 
However, following oral arguments, several scholars noted an apparent 
disconnect between the Justices and the respective parties’ attorneys, 
which yielded anything but a simple answer.193  For much of the hour-long 
oral argument, the Justices quibbled with the attorneys regarding the 
remedy of the situation, which was not briefed by either party, rather than 
the potential Fourth Amendment rights violation that occurred.194 
A. Relevant Facts 
Two scholars have provided an in-depth recitation of the facts of 
Heien,195 but in short, the defendant was pulled over because of a broken 
taillight.196  The officer gave the defendant a warning ticket for the brake 
light.197  During the stop, however, the officer “began to suspect” that the 
defendant possessed contraband.198  The defendant consented to the 
officer’s request to search the vehicle.  The search revealed cocaine.199  
The defendant, charged with trafficking cocaine, attempted to suppress the 
evidence as an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment, arguing that 
the traffic stop itself was unconstitutional.200  According to the defendant, 
North Carolina laws “require a vehicle neither to have all brake lights in 
good working order nor to be equipped with more than one brake light.”201 
                                                                                                                                     
 193 See, e.g., Rory Little, Argument analysis: A simple answer to a deceptively simple 
Fourth Amendment question?, SCOTUSblog (Oct. 8, 2014, 12:26 PM), http://www
.scotusblog.com/2014/10/argument-analysis-a-simple-answer-to-a-deceptively-simple-
fourth-amendment-question/; Orin S. Kerr, Oral Argument in Heien v. North Carolina, The 
Volokh Conspiracy (October 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/10/06/oral-argument-in-heien-v-north-carolina/ (last visited October 
20, 2014); Leslie Shoebotham, Guest Blog: Leslie Shoebotham, Oral Argument in Heien 
v. North Carolina: The Road to Nowhere or the Road to Reasonableness?, (October 7, 
2014), http://hamilton-griffin.com/guest-blog-leslie-shoebotham-oral-argument-in-heien-
v-north-carolina-the-road-to-nowhere-or-the-road-to-reasonableness/ (last visited October 
20, 2014). 
 194 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Heien v. North Carolina, 134 S. Ct. 1872 
(2014) (No. 13-604). 
 195 See Brittanee Friedman, Constitutional Law-Evidence Seized Based on Reasonable 
Police Mistake of Law Held Admissible in North Carolina Court-State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 
351 (N.C. 2012), 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249, 249-50 (2014); John B. Lyman, Goldilocks 
and the Fourth Amendment: Why the Supreme Court of North Carolina Missed an 
Opportunity to Get Officer Mistakes of Law “Just Right” in State v. Heien, 92 N.C. L. REV. 
1012, 1018-19 (2014). 
 196 State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 352 (N.C. 2012). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 353. 
 201 Id. 
256 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 11:228 
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed with the 
defendant and held that a violation warranting a traffic stop did not, in fact, 
occur.202  The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, reversed,203 
holding that a mistake of law is not per se unreasonable if, upon 
“considering the totality of the circumstances,” the mistake is objectively 
reasonable.204 According to the court, the mistake was reasonable because 
the officer “could have reasonably believed that he witnessed a violation 
of [North Carolina’s] motor vehicle laws.”205 
B. Possible Rulings and Analysis 
This case has important practical implications as the Supreme Court 
could hand down a decision that resolves the split that divides the federal 
circuits.  The Court could also make an alternative ruling.  One scholar 
succinctly notes three potential, on-the-merits “legal paths” available to 
the Court: 1) hold the stop to be lawful and thus admit the evidence; 2) 
hold the stop unlawful, but that the evidence is admissible since the 
exclusionary rule does not apply under the “good faith exception”; or 3) 
hold the stop unlawful and apply the exclusionary rule, thereby 
suppressing the evidence.206 
Alternatively, the Court may hand down a decision that is not based 
on the merits of the case, such as simply dismissing Heien as 
improvidently granted,207 given the Court’s focus on the exclusionary rule 
during the oral argument.  The Court could also place deference on the 
defendant’s consent to the search following the traffic stop, and hold the 
consent mitigates the potential Fourth Amendment rights violation 
altogether. 
Regardless of the Court’s potential ruling, however, Heien may be 
the wrong case to resolve this split.  The split will persist unless the Court 
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either invalidates the traffic stop and renders a categorical rule that makes 
any police officer’s mistake of law unreasonable, or upholds the traffic 
stop and allows a “reasonable” mistake of law.  This Comment urges for 
a categorical rule because anything less will provide too much room for 
error. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court will eventually have to weigh in on the issue of 
what results when a police officer makes a traffic stop premised on a 
mistake of law.  Perhaps this ruling will come sooner than expected in 
Heien v. North Carolina.  Regardless, as this Comment shows, a number 
of circuit courts have drawn a line in the sand.  The majority of federal 
courts of appeals weighing in have ruled for a categorical exclusion of 
evidence, while only the Eighth Circuit has ruled for an objective 
reasonableness approach. 
This Comment argues that such a situation should result in the 
categorical exclusion of evidence.  Any traffic stop premised on a mistake 
of law is objectively unreasonable.  A traffic stop cannot be adequate 
absent a legitimate violation of law.  Allowing officers to make stops 
without having the requisite probable cause or reasonable suspicion, or 
without an objective basis for an actual violation of law, expands the scope 
of law enforcement officers.  This expansion can result in a law that is only 
fiction or “pretended.”208 
It is not too much to ask our police officers to know the law they are 
empowered to enforce.209  Upholding decisions because law may be a bit 
complex or vast are excuses that should be dealt within the legislature, not 
the courts.  These excuses should not be wholly rejected when sensitive 
individual liberties are at stake.  The Supreme Court needs to weigh in and 
clarify this divisive issue.  The Court should articulate the approach 
championed by the majority of federal courts of appeals that have 
considered the issue, a categorical exclusion. 
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